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Bell’s theorem states that no local realistic explanation of quantum mechanical predictions is
possible, in which the experimenter has a freedom to choose between different measurement settings.
Within a local realistic picture the violation of Bell’s inequalities can only be understood if this
freedom is denied. We determine the minimal degree to which the experimenter’s freedom has
to be abandoned, if one wants to keep such a picture and be in agreement with the experiment.
Furthermore, the freedom in choosing experimental arrangements may be considered as a resource,
since its lacking can be used by an eavesdropper to harm the security of quantum communication.
We analyze the security of quantum key distribution as a function of the (partial) knowledge the
eavesdropper has about the future choices of measurement settings which are made by the authorized
parties (e.g. on the basis of some quasi-random generator). We show that the equivalence between
the violation of Bell’s inequality and the efficient extraction of a secure key — which exists for
the case of complete freedom (no setting knowledge) — is lost unless one adapts the bound of the
inequality according to this lack of freedom.
I. INTRODUCTION
Can the experimenter’s free-will be experimentally
tested? It seems unreasonable to expect that this ques-
tion can be answered unconditionally. The philosophi-
cal debate on whether or not our choices are ultimately
up to ourselves or are just a predetermined illusion has
lasted for centuries without reaching a final conclusion.
Here we pursue our profession as physicists reminding
ourselves of Einstein’s words that ”It is the theory which
decides what we can observe”. Thus, roughly speaking,
one could say that it is the theory that decides whether
or not the experimenter’s free-will can be tested. Here we
consider the experimenter’s freedom of choosing between
different possible measurement settings and argue that,
within a local realistic theory, it can experimentally be
tested. Following Gill et al. [1] this freedom will be de-
fined as the independence of the experimenter’s choice of
measurement settings from the local realistic mechanism
that determines the actual measurement results.
The theorem of John Bell [2] states the impossibil-
ity of a local realistic explanation of quantum mechan-
ics in which the experimenter has a freedom to choose
between different experimental arrangements. This is
demonstrated by the experimental confirmation of the vi-
olation of Bell’s inequalities in agreement with quantum
mechanical predictions. The philosophical implications
of Bell’s theorem are startling: either one must abandon
the experimenter’s freedom, or the view that external
reality exists prior to and independent of observations
(realism), or dramatically revise our concepts of space
and time (locality). Needless to say, either of the choices
requires radical revision of the ruling philosophical view
of most of the scientists and is in sharp contrast to our
every-day experience.
If one chooses to keep a local realistic picture and to
deny the experimenter’s freedom, then one must accept
a world in which the measurement settings that are gen-
erated by the experimenter’s choice (or by tossing a coin,
or — to put it in a grotesque way — by the parity of the
number of cars passing the laboratory within n seconds,
where n is given by the fourth decimal of the cube of
the actual temperature in degrees Fahrenheit) are deter-
mined in advance and correlated with the actual outcome
of the measurement. Bell himself comments such theories
with the words [3]: ”A theory may appear in which such
conspiracies inevitably occur, and these conspiracies may
then seem more digestible than the non-localities of other
theories. When that theory is announced I will not refuse
to listen, either on methodological or other grounds. But
I will not myself try to make such a theory.”
In this paper we show that the experimentally observed
degree of violation of Bell’s inequalities sets a minimal
degree to which the free choice has to be abandoned if
one insists on a local realistic explanation. Thus, not ev-
ery local realistic theory denying free choice is in agree-
ment with observations. Finally, extending the idea of
Hwang [4], we argue that the experimenter’s freedom can
be considered as a resource in quantum communication
as its lacking can be used by an eavesdropper to harm its
security. We analyze the security in quantum key distri-
bution as a function of the knowledge the eavesdropper
has about the choice of measurement settings which is
made by the authorized parties in the protocol.
II. BELL’S INEQUALITIES WITH REDUCED
EXPERIMENTER’S FREEDOM
Realism supposes that the measurement results are de-
termined by ”hidden variables” which exist prior to and
independent of observation. Locality supposes that the
2results obtained at one location are independent of any
measurements or actions performed at space-like sepa-
rated regions. Finally, ”freedom of choice” assumes that
the experimenter’s choice of the measurement setting is
independent of the local realistic mechanism which de-
termines the measurement results. In what follows we
pursue the approach of Gill et al. [1] in formulating these
concepts in a mathematically rigorous way.
Consider two spatially separated partners, Alice and
Bob, performing space-like separated experiments on
particles which are pairwise emitted by some source. Let
X and Y denote the actual measurement outcomes ob-
tained, and k and l the actual measurement settings cho-
sen by Alice and Bob, respectively. The outcomes X and
Y can take values +1 or −1, and the settings k and l val-
ues 1 or 2. The probability to observe the two outcomes
to be equal, X = Y , under the chosen k (Alice) and l
(Bob) is denoted by P (X=Y |kl).
Local realism assumes the existence of a quadruple of
variables {X1, X2, Y1, Y2}, each taking values +1 or −1,
which represents the potential measurement outcomes in
a thought experiment, under any of the possible mea-
surement settings. This quadruple exists independently
of whether any or which experiment is actually performed
on either side. Because of locality the variables on Al-
ice’s side do not depend on the choice of setting on
Bob’s side, and vice versa. Thus, local realism requires
X ∈ {X1, X2} and Y ∈ {Y1, Y2}.
The freedom assumption expresses the independence
between the choice k, l of the measurement settings
and the local realistic mechanism which finally se-
lects the actual outcomes X,Y from the potential ones
X1, X2, Y1, Y2. Gill et al. [1] put this formally in the
requirement that {k, l} are statistically independent of
{X1, X2, Y1, Y2}. This means that in many thought repe-
titions of the experiment the probabilities with which the
quadruple {X1, X2, Y1, Y2} takes on any of its 24 possible
values remain the same within each subensemble defined
by the four possible combinations of k and l. In particu-
lar, one has P (Xk=Yl)=P (X=Y |kl), where P (Xk=Yl)
is the (mathematical) probability for having Xk = Yl.
What if the experimenter’s freedom is just an illusion?
Imagine that the choices of experimental settings and
experimental results are both consequences of some com-
mon local realistic mechanism. In such a case the two
probabilities P (Xk = Yl) and P (X = Y |kl) may differ
from each other and we use their difference
∆kl ≡ P (X=Y |kl)− P (Xk=Yl) (1)
to measure the lack of freedom. This measure can ac-
quire values from −1 to 1, and the freedom case cor-
responds to all ∆kl = 0. It is important to note that
while the probabilities P (X = Y |kl) can directly be
measured, the P (Xk = Yl) are only mathematical en-
tities of the local realistic theory without a direct op-
erational meaning. Nevertheless, they satisfy a set-
theoretical constraint which is mathematically equivalent
to the Clauser–Horne–Shimony–Holt (CHSH) inequal-
ity [5]. The product of local realistic results X2Y2 is al-
ways equal to the multiplication of (X1Y1)(X1Y2)(X2Y1),
because the square of a dichotomic variable, with values
+1 or −1, is equal to +1. This implies that the following
expression can attain only one of two values [1]:
1 {X1 = Y1}+ 1 {X1 = Y2}
+ 1 {X2 = Y1} − 1 {X2 = Y2} = 0 or 2 , (2)
where 1 {Xk = Yl} is the indicator of the event Xk = Yl,
i.e., it is equal to 1 if it happens and 0 if it does not
happen. The expectation value of the indicator variable
is the probability for the event to happen, P (Xk = Yl).
Finally the expectation value of the left-hand side can-
not be greater than the maximum value of the averaged
expression:
SCHSH ≡ P (X1=Y1) + P (X1=Y2)
+ P (X2=Y1)− P (X2=Y2) ≤ 2 . (3)
The equivalence to the CHSH inequality is evident as
soon as one recalls that the correlation function of di-
chotomic variables equals Ekl = 2P (Xk = Yl) − 1. The
above inequality, in turn, implies a new bound on the set
of probabilities that can experimentally be measured:
S∆ ≡ P (X=Y |11) + P (X=Y |12) (4)
+ P (X=Y |21)− P (X=Y |22) ≤ 2 + ∆CHSH,
where ∆CHSH ≡ ∆11+∆12+∆21−∆22. Note that on the
basis of measured probabilities (relative frequencies) one
cannot make statements about the individual measures
∆kl but rather on their combination as given in ∆CHSH.
In particular, it is possible that ∆CHSH = 0, although
all the individual ∆kl 6= 0, and it may also be negative.
However, only the case of positive ∆CHSH — implying at
least one individual ∆kl to be unequal to zero — makes
the freedom assumption within a local realistic model
experimentally testable, as the bound on the right-hand
side of (4) is increased. As well one could study the lower
bounds of SCHSH and S∆.
To give an example of the lack of freedom model,
imagine a local realistic mechanism in which the source
”knows” in advance the settings “to be chosen” by Al-
ice and Bob. The source can ”arbitrarily” manipulate
the value of S∆ in this case. Even the algebraic (logical)
bound of S∆ = 3 can be reached: whenever Alice and
Bob both measure the second setting, the source sends
(local realistic) correlated pairs such that the measure-
ment results anticoincide, i.e. P (X = Y |22) = 0, and in
all other measurements it produces pairs for which the
results coincide, i.e. P (X = Y |11) = P (X = Y |12) =
P (X=Y |21) = 1, and thus S∆ = 3. For this local real-
istic model (without freedom) inequality (4) is satisfied,
but only because of the adapted bound 2 + ∆CHSH = 3.
Now imagine another experiment, in which the observers
(freely) choose their settings independently from the lo-
cal realistic source. Then P (X=Y |kl) = P (Xk=Yl), i.e.
3∆CHSH = 0, and inequality (4) is fulfilled with the bound
of 2, as it becomes the CHSH inequality (3).
The value of ∆CHSH for which the inequality is still
satisfied, defines the minimal extent to which the ex-
perimenter’s freedom has to be abandoned such that a
local realistic explanation of the experiment is still pos-
sible. Denote the left-hand side of inequality (4) as the
CHSH expression. The maximal possible quantum value,
SQM = 1+
√
2, of this expression can be observed for the
maximally entangled state, for example, the singlet state
|ψ−〉 = (|0〉|1〉− |1〉|0〉)/√2, where |0〉 and |1〉 are two or-
thogonal quantum states, and for an appropriate choice
of possible settings {k, l}. This quantum value requires
an abandonment of the experimentalist’s freedom to the
extent of at least ∆CHSH =
√
2− 1 ≈ 0.414.
Since, based on the experiment, we can only make
statements about ∆CHSH, a large number of local real-
istic theories are possible that deny the experimenter’s
freedom and are in agreement with quantum mechani-
cal predictions and experiments. In order to be able to
make further statements about these theories we need
to impose some structure on them. In what follows we
restrict ourselves to the case where the degree to which
the freedom is abandoned — that is the absolute value
of the measure ∆kl — is independent of the actual ex-
periment performed, i.e. |∆kl| = ∆ is the same for all
k, l. Roughly speaking, the level of conspiracy is as-
sumed to be the same for all experimental situations.
Choosing ∆11 = ∆12 = ∆21 = −∆22 ≡ ∆ one obtains
∆ = 14 (
√
2 − 1) ≈ 0.104 for the minimal degree required
to explain the quantum value of the CHSH expression by
a local realistic model. If all the ∆kl are positive (i.e. if
P (X=Y |kl) > P (Xk=Yl) for all k, l), one finds the even
higher value ∆ = 12 (
√
2− 1) ≈ 0.207.
It is known that with an increasing number of parties,
N , the discrepancy between the results of Bell tests and
local realistic predictions that respect the experimenter’s
freedom increases rapidly (exponentially) with N [6]. We
now determine how the degree of the lack of freedom
needs to scale with N in a local realistic theory that
agrees with these tests.
Consider N space-like separated parties who can each
choose between two possible measurement settings. Let
X(j)∈{1,−1} denote the actual measurement result ob-
tained and kj ∈ {1, 2} the actual measurement setting
chosen by party j. The probability to observe correla-
tion, i.e. the probability that the product of local results
is equal to 1 if settings k1, ..., kN are chosen, is denoted by
P (
∏N
j=1X
(j)=1|k1...kN ). Local realism assumes the ex-
istence of 2N numbers {X(1)1 , X(1)2 , ..., X(N)1 , X(N)2 }, each
taking values +1 or −1 and representing the potential
measurement outcomes of N parties under any possible
combination of their measurement settings. The (math-
ematical) probability that the product of the potential
outcomes is equal to 1 is denoted by P (
∏N
j=1X
(j)
kj
= 1).
Note again that this probability cannot be measured ex-
perimentally.
We apply the approach used above to the present case
of N parties. We introduce the difference
∆k1...kN ≡ P (
∏N
j=1X
(j)=1|k1...kN )− P (
∏N
j=1X
(j)
kj
=1)
(5)
to measure the lack of freedom of N experimenters. The
probabilities P (
∏N
j=1X
(j)
kj
= 1) satisfy a set-theoretical
constraint that is mathematically equivalent to the Mer-
min inequality [6] (the particular form used here is
from [7]):
M ≡
2∑
k1,...,kN=1
s(k1, ..., kN )P (
∏N
j=1X
(j)
kj
=1) ≤ B(N) ,
(6)
where s(k1, ..., kN ) = sin
[
(k1 + ...+ kN )
pi
2
]
are coeffi-
cients taking values 0, +1 or −1. The inequality is
bounded by B(N)= 12
[
2⌊N/2⌋+2N/2 sin(Npi4 )
]
, where ⌊x⌋
is the greatest integer less or equal to x. Using inequal-
ity (6) and definition (5), one obtains a new inequality:
M∆ ≡
2∑
k1,...,kN=1
s(k1, ..., kN )P (
∏N
j=1X
(j)=1|k1...kN )
≤ B(N) + ∆Merm, (7)
where ∆Merm =
∑2
k1,...,kN=1
s(k1, ..., kN )∆k1...kN . Im-
portantly, the probabilities entering this inequality are
measurable.
In a Bell experiment involving the maximally en-
tangled N -party (GHZ) state one observes MQM =
1
2
[
2N−1 + 2N/2 sin(Npi4 )
]
for the maximal possible value
of the left-hand side of inequality (7). This implies
2N−2 − 2⌊(N−2)/2⌋ for the minimal value of ∆Merm =
MQM − B(N) that still allows a local realistic explana-
tion of the experiment. Suppose again that the degree
of the lack of freedom is independent of the measure-
ment setting. With an adequate choice of signs one has
∆k1...kN = ∆N for k’s for which s(k1, ..., kN ) = 1 and
∆k1...kN =−∆N for k’s for which s(k1, ..., kN )=−1. This
results in ∆Merm = 2
N−1∆N . Finally, one obtains that
the degree to which the experimenter’s freedom has to be
abandoned in order to have an agreement between local
realism and Bell’s experiments with N parties saturates
exponentially fast with N as ∆N =
1
2 − 12⌊(N+1)/2⌋ . In the
limit of infinitely many partners ∆N reaches the value
of 12 . It is remarkable that if the sign of all ∆k1...kN is
chosen positive, there will be no way to obtain agreement
between local realism and the experimental results, since
∆N would have to leave the range from −1 to +1 in the
limit of large N . The other argument which invalidates
all ∆k1...kN to be positive involves only four parties. In
this case in the expression defined in (7) the number of
probabilities with a positive sign is equal to the number
of probabilities with a negative sign. Thus, if all ∆k1...kN
are positive and have the same value they cancel each
other, i.e. ∆Merm = 0, and no explanation of the viola-
tion of the bound B(N=4) is possible.
4In this section we showed that quantum correlations for
N partners can be explained within local realism only if
both the number of measurement settings in which the
experimenter’s freedom is abandoned (all 2N−1 combi-
nations of local settings entering the Mermin inequality)
increases exponentially and the degree of this abandon-
ment saturates exponentially fast with N . Furthermore,
from the viewpoint of local realism that denies freedom,
there is no obvious reason why the quantum bound of
the CHSH inequality is 1+
√
2 and not, for example, the
maximal possible logical bound of 3. In our opinion these
objections clearly show that the local realistic program
goes squarely against every effort for simple and sensi-
ble explanations of our observations. In particular, in
order to explain the violation of Bell’s inequality within
local realism, one has to introduce purely theoretical and
experimentally not accessible entities such as the (math-
ematical) probabilities P (Xk = Yl). This is against the
spirit of Ockham’s razor principle.
III. QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION WITH
REDUCED EXPERIMENTER’S FREEDOM
The violation of Bell’s inequality by legitimate parties
was found to be a necessary and sufficient condition for
their efficient extraction of a quantum secret key [8, 9],
showing an appealing connection between secure key dis-
tribution and the violation of local realism.
Apart from its fundamental meaning, the freedom to
choose between different measurement settings can be
regarded as an important resource in quantum secret
key distribution. In particular, as recently shown by
Hwang [4], an eavesdropper can both simulate the vi-
olation of Bell’s inequality and successfully eavesdrop, if
the freedom in choosing the settings by legitimate part-
ners is abandoned. Effectively, one can assume that each
measurement device chooses its settings according to a
pseudo-random sequence that is installed in the device
beforehand. Such a model of lack of freedom allows
the eavesdropper to know the algorithm generating the
pseudo-random numbers, at least to some extent, and
correspondingly predict the future measurement settings
of the legitimate parties.
In what follows we will consider an Ekert-like proto-
col [10] — a combination of the BBM92 protocol [11]
(which is an application of the BB84 protocol [12] to en-
tangled states) and a CHSH test — and analyze both the
violation of Bell’s inequality and the security of the key
distribution as a function of the amount of knowledge
that the eavesdropper Eve (E) has about the settings
chosen by the legitimate parties Alice (A) and Bob (B).
We have chosen this combination of BBM92 and CHSH
— henceforth denoted as the BBM–CHSH protocol —
because it allows to test the relationship between Bell’s
theorem and secure quantum key distribution in a sin-
gle protocol. (In contrast to the original Ekert protocol
with non-orthogonal key establishing settings, there is a
a1
a2 b2
b3b4
b1
Alice Bob
FIG. 1: Settings in the BBM–CHSH protocol. Alice chooses
between two orthogonal measurement directions α1 and α2,
whereas Bob has four different possibilities, namely the same
directions as Alice, i.e., β1 and β2, as well as two directions
rotated by pi
4
, i.e. β3 and β4.
security proof for the BBM92 attached to the error rate.)
Consider a source that emits pairs of spin- 12 particles
in the singlet state |ψ−〉 = (|z+〉|z−〉 − |z−〉|z+〉)/√2,
where |z+〉 and |z−〉 denote spin-up and spin-down along
the z-direction, respectively. The legitimate parties mea-
sure the incoming particles in the x, y-plane. Alice can
choose between two orthogonal settings, characterized
by the azimuthal angles α1 ≡ 0 and α2 ≡ pi2 , whereas
Bob has 4 possible measurement directions, namely β1 ≡
α1 ≡ 0, β2 ≡ α2 ≡ pi2 , β3 ≡ pi4 , and β4 ≡ 3pi4 (note that
the βj are not numbered in ascending order). Therefore,
depending on their choice of settings, they sometimes
measure correlations for determining the violation of the
CHSH inequality, namely with the 4 settings (α1, β3),
(α1, β4), (α2, β3), and (α2, β4), or they can establish a
key, since their outcomes are perfectly anti-correlated for
measurements along (α1, β1) and (α2, β2). If they choose
(α1, β2) or (α2, β1), i.e. orthogonal directions, they dis-
card their results. A schematic of the measurement di-
rections is shown in figure 1.
Let P (X = −Y |ij) denote the probability that Alice
and Bob obtain anti-correlated results if they measure
along αi and βj , respectively, where i = 1, 2 and j =
1, 2, 3, 4. Within the freedom assumption the (measured)
CHSH expression has the form
S ≡ P (X=−Y |13) + P (X=−Y |23)
+ P (X=−Y |24)− P (X=−Y |14) ≤ 2 . (8)
For the (maximally entangled) singlet state it is equal
to 1 +
√
2. The classical bound is 2, whereas the logical
bound is equal to 3.
Let us now assume that an eavesdropper, Eve, has
some knowledge about the choice of settings of Alice and
Bob, for instance by having some insight into their ran-
dom number generators. We model this knowledge in
the following way: In each run, i.e., for each singlet pair,
Eve knows that the combination of local settings (αi, βj)
will happen with probability qij . For simplicity we as-
sume that one out of the 8 joint settings will happen with
(high) probability Q ≥ 18 , whereas all the others 7 have
equal (low) probability 1−Q7 to be manifested. The num-
5ber Q shall be the same for all runs; the setting which it
indicates to be most probable of course changes from run
to run. The case Q = 1 corresponds to perfect knowledge
of the eavesdropper and to the complete lack of free will
of Alice and Bob, whereas Q = 18 means that Eve has no
knowledge at all.
Now we impose the following attack algorithm: If Eve
believes one of the CHSH settings to be most likely, she
sends the corresponding optimal product state. In gen-
eral, if qij = Q, which means that the setting (αi, βj) is
most probable from Eve’s viewpoint, she intercepts and
sends either |αi〉A |βj + pi〉B or |αi + pi〉A |βj〉B (by toss-
ing a fair coin, such that the local results of Alice and
Bob are always totally random). Only in the special case
q14 = Q, Eve sends |α1〉A |β4〉B or |α1 + pi〉A |β4 + pi〉B.
This is the CHSH setting where the probability of anti-
correlation should be minimized, since P (X=−Y |14) ap-
pears with a minus sign in the CHSH inequality. There-
fore, she attacks the CHSH measurements in order to
achieve a maximal violation (S = 3) and the key estab-
lishing measurements to find the key (or rather produce
it herself).
To further motivate why we have chosen this attack
algorithm, we note that (i) it is canonical in the way that
Eve attacks all events in the same way, namely with the
appropriate product state. (ii) The attack is already good
enough to show that the connection between violation of
local realism and secure key distribution is lost in the case
where the eavesdropper has partial knowledge about the
settings. (iii) Eve sends a product state for each pair that
is generated by the source; hence, Alice and Bob are faced
with measurement results that can be described by local
realism but nevertheless can violate the CHSH inequality
(8) due to restricted freedom.
According to Eve’s setting knowledge and the attack
strategy, one can compute the value for the CHSH expres-
sion as measured by Alice and Bob. In the subensemble of
cases where, e.g., Alice measures along α1 and Bob along
β3, Eve sends with probability Q the product states re-
sulting in anti-correlations P (X = −Y |13) = 1. In the
rest of the cases she sends 7 possible ”wrong guesses”
which each happen with probability 1−Q7 and for each
of them the probability for anti-correlations takes values
between 12 and cos
2 pi
8 ≈ 0.854, depending on the specific
wrong attack. The measured probability P (X=−Y |13)
is the expectation value of all 8 sets of anti-correlated re-
sults weighted with their probabilities to happen. Anal-
ogously, the probabilities for anti-correlation in the other
subensembles are calculated and we find
P (X=−Y |13) = Q+ 1−Q7
(
5
2 + 2 cos
2 pi
8
)
, (9)
P (X=−Y |23) = P (X=−Y |13) , (10)
P (X=−Y |24) = Q+ 1−Q7
(
5
2 + cos
2 pi
8 + sin
2 pi
8
)
, (11)
P (X=−Y |14) = 1−Q7
(
5
2 + cos
2 pi
8 + sin
2 pi
8
)
. (12)
The CHSH expression finally results in
S = 3Q+ 1−Q7
(
5 + 4 cos2 pi8
) ≈ 1.2 + 1.8Q . (13)
IAB
Scl
Sqm
S
IBE
IBE
FIG. 2: (a) The (measured) CHSH expression S as a function
of Eve’s setting knowledge Q (solid line). The CHSH inequal-
ity (8) with classical bound Scl = 2 (dotted line) is violated
for every setting knowledge Q > Qcl ≈ 0.44. The quantum
bound Sqm = 1 +
√
2 is also indicated. (b) The mutual in-
formation between Alice and Bob IAB (dashed line) and the
actual mutual information between Bob and Eve IBE (solid
line), which is always smaller than (or equal to) the Alice–Eve
mutual information. For every setting knowledge Q one has
IBE ≥ IAB and thus Alice and Bob can never extract a secret
key. An optimal attack without setting knowledge leads to
I˜BE (dotted line). Only for Q ≤ Q0 ≈ 0.63 the BBM–CHSH
protocol is secure, because Alice and Bob find IAB ≤ I˜BE and
they will not use their key.
Thus, the logical bound Slog ≡ 3 is reached in the limit
Q → 1. The classical bound of Scl ≡ 2 is beaten for all
Q > Qcl ≈ 0.44 and the quantum mechanics (Cirel’son)
bound Sqm ≡ 1 +
√
2 ≈ 2.41 is beaten for setting knowl-
edge Q > Qqm ≈ 0.67. If Q is larger than Qqm, Eve
should reduce the strength of her attack, e.g. by mixing
some noise into her product states, for otherwise even the
quantum bound would be broken. The CHSH expression
(13) and the bounds are shown in figure 2a.
We can make the direct connection with section II,
where now Eve plays the role of ”conspiratorial” local
realistic nature. Accordingly, we can introduce the differ-
ence between the measured probabilities P (X =−Y |ij)
and their mathematical (set constraint fulfilling) coun-
terparts P (Xi=−Yj) to which the experimenter has no
access. The latter are given by the first if one substitutes
the valueQ = 18 as this corresponds to the case where Eve
has no setting knowledge and Alice and Bob are receiv-
ing a classical mixture of equally weighted product states
for each run: P (Xi=−Yj) = P (X=−Y |ij)|Q=1/8. The
6difference
∆ij ≡ P (X=−Y |ij)− P (Xi=−Yj) (14)
measures the lack of freedom. The set constraint fulfilling
CHSH expression is
SCHSH ≡ P (X1=−Y3) + P (X2=−Y3)
+ P (X2=−Y4)− P (X1=−Y4) ≤ 2 , (15)
and therefore
S ≤ 2 + ∆CHSH , (16)
where ∆CHSH ≡ ∆13+∆23+∆24−∆14. Inequality (16) is
fulfilled if and only if (15) is fulfilled and this is the case
because the (mathematical) probabilities P (Xi = −Yj)
correspond to a mixture of product states and therefore
obey local realism.
When is Eve’s knowledge about the settings also suf-
ficient to find out the key which is established by Alice
and Bob? To answer this question, we have to compute
mutual informations between the parties. The mutual in-
formation between Alice and Bob is determined by the bit
error rate [8] which they can compute in the subensembles
where they measured along α1 = β1 = 0 or α2 = β2 =
pi
2 .
Let us consider the first; the error rate in the second is the
same for symmetry reasons. The bit error rate D is given
by the sum of 8 terms corresponding to the 8 settings
that were potentially possible from Eve’s point of view.
Each term is the probability with which Eve believed this
event would happen — Q for the event (α1, β1) itself and
1−Q
7 for all the others (the wrong guesses), corresponding
to our definition of the setting knowledge — multiplied
with the probability that the attack (αi, βj) leads to a
correlation (error) rather than an anti-correlation as for
the original singlet state. This ”destruction probability”
is 0 for the ”correct” event (α1, β1), it is sin
2 pi
8 for both
(α1, β3) and (α1, β4), and
1
2 for all the others (where an
orthogonal state was sent to Alice or Bob). Finally, we
find the bit error rate
D = 1−Q7
(
5
2 + 2 sin
2 pi
8
) ≈ 0.4 (1−Q) . (17)
The mutual information between Alice and Bob is
IAB ≡ 1−H(D) , (18)
with H(p) ≡ −p lg p− (1 − p) lg(1 − p) the Shannon en-
tropy, where lg denotes the logarithm with base 2.
The maximal mutual information between Alice (or
Bob for symmetry reasons) and Eve from Alice’s and
Bob’s viewpoint, which can be attained by an optimal
attack of Eve for a given error rate D and under the con-
dition that Eve has no setting knowledge, is given by [8]
I˜AE = I˜BE = 1−H(12+
√
D −D2) . (19)
The actual mutual information between Alice and Eve,
IAE, can be computed from the conditional entropyHA|E
by IAE = HA−HA|E, where Alice’s Shannon information
is HA = 1, since the outcomes of Alice are always locally
random for all possible attacks. As all chosen settings
are publicly revealed after the measurements, Eve can
compute HA|E in the subensemble of the key establishing
measurement (α1, β1). (If Alice and Bob measure along
(α2, β2), the result does not change.) The calculation
itself is straightforward, once one realizes that HA|e = 0
for all 4 events e in which Eve (justly) believed that Alice
would choose α1, as Eve knows her result in this case. If
Eve made the (wrong) guess α2 then HA|e = 1 for these
4 possible events, for Alice measures in the orthogonal
direction α1. Thus, HA|E = 4
1−Q
7 and
IAE = 1− 4 1−Q7 = 37 + 47 Q . (20)
Analogously, one can find the actual mutual information
between Bob and Eve:
IBE = 1− 1−Q7
(
2 + 4H(cos2 pi8 )
) ≈ 0.37 + 0.63Q , (21)
which is always smaller than (or equal to) IAE. Secret-
key agreement between Alice and Bob using only er-
ror correction and privacy amplification is possible if
and only if the Alice-Bob mutual information is greater
than the minimum of the Alice–Eve and Bob–Eve
mutual information, that is, if and only if IAB >
min(IAE, IBE) [13]. We have
IAB ≤ IBE (22)
for all Q and equality only holds for Q = 1. Alice and
Bob can never extract a secret key, since the condition
IAB > IBE is never fulfilled (figure 2b).
The well-known critical error rate D0 =
1
2 (1 − 1√2 ) ≈
0.15 corresponds, according to (17), to a setting knowl-
edge Q0 ≈ 0.63. For this knowledge IAB = I˜BE. If
Q > Q0, the BBM–CHSH protocol is insecure, since
IAB ≤ IBE and Alice and Bob find both their error rate
to be sufficiently small (below D0) and the CHSH in-
equality (8) to be violated, which makes them think they
are safe. For Q ≤ Q0 Eve’s setting knowledge is ”in-
sufficient” and the protocol becomes secure: Alice and
Bob cannot extract a secret key because still IAB < IBE,
but they find IAB ≤ I˜BE and know that there might be
an eavesdropper and thus they will not use the key. For
0.44 ≈ Qcl < Q ≤ Q0 ≈ 0.63 they will find the CHSH in-
equality (8) to be violated (S > 2) and nonetheless they
cannot extract a secret key (IAB ≤ I˜BE, D ≥ D0). There-
fore, we deduce that the equivalence between the viola-
tion of Bell’s inequality (with complete freedom) and the
secure key distribution (without freedom) is lost. (How-
ever, the new bound in inequality (16) is never broken
and, in fact, a secret key can never be extracted.)
If Alice and Bob knew Q, which means they knew to
which extent their freedom is restricted, and if they cal-
culated the maximal ∆CHSH under the constraint of an
insecure key, IAB ≤ min(IAE, IBE), for all possible at-
tacks, then a violation of the CHSH inequality with the
7new bound 2 + ∆CHSH would be equivalent to the pos-
sibility of efficient secret key extraction (unless the new
bound is larger than Sqm = 1 +
√
2). A violation of
this new bound is equivalent to statement that the clas-
sical bound 2 is violated in the case of total freedom and
for this situation there exists a complete equivalence be-
tween the CHSH inequality violation and the security of
the BBM protocol [8, 9].
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The violation of Bell’s inequalities is an experimental
fact. Within a local realistic program this fact can only
be explained if the experimenter’s freedom in choosing
between different measurement settings is denied (mod-
ulo known loopholes, considered by most scientists to be
of technical nature). For a local realist our results show
that both the number of settings in which the freedom
is abandoned grows exponentially and the degree of this
abandonment saturates exponentially fast with the num-
ber of parties. For the present authors, however, these
results are rather an indication of the absurdity of the
program itself. Nevertheless, they give rise to new se-
curity criteria for quantum cryptography in situations in
which the measurement settings chosen by the autho-
rized parties are partially revealed by an eavesdropper.
This contradicts the standard assumption in cryptogra-
phy in which the laboratories of the authorized parties
are safe and no relevant information is allowed to leak
out from them. If this assumption is not fulfilled, we
showed that the violation of the standard CHSH inequal-
ity is not equivalent to a secure key distribution anymore.
Nevertheless, it is possible to define a new (higher) bound
whose violation indeed guarantees the security of the key.
Therefore, one can keep the security while, to some ex-
tent, relaxing the assumption that no information is re-
vealed to an eavesdropper, as long as the amount of this
information is known.
Acknowledgements
This work has been supported by the Austrian Science
Foundation (FWF) Project SFB 1506 and the European
Commission (RAMBOQ). Cˇ. B. thanks the British Coun-
cil in Austria. T. P. is supported by FNP and MNiI
Grant No. 1 P03B 04927. The collaboration is part of an
OeAD/MNiI program.
[1] R. D. Gill, G. Weihs, A. Zeilinger, and M. Z˙ukowski,
Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. USA, 9, 14632 (2002); R. D. Gill,
G. Weihs, A. Zeilinger, and M. Z˙ukowski, Europhys. Lett.
61, 282 (2003).
[2] J. S. Bell, Physics (Long Island City, N.Y.), 1, 195 (1964).
[3] J. S. Bell, Free Variables and Local Causality, Dialectica
39, 103-106 (1985).
[4] W.-Y. Hwang, Phys. Rev. A 71, 052329 (2005).
[5] J. F. Clauser, M. Horne, A. Shimony, and R. Holt, Phys.
Rev. Lett. 23, 880 (1969).
[6] N. D. Mermin, Phys. Rev. Lett. 65, 1838 (1990).
[7] M. Z˙ukowski and Cˇ. Brukner, Phys. Rev. Lett. 88,
210401 (2002).
[8] N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittel, and H. Zbinden, Rev.
Mod. Phys. 74, 145 (2002).
[9] V. Scarani and N. Gisin, Phys. Rev. Lett. 87, 117901
(2001); A. Acin, N. Gisin, L. Masanes, and V. Scarani,
Int. J. Quant. Inf. 2, 23 (2004).
[10] A. K. Ekert, Phys. Rev. Lett. 67, 661 (1991).
[11] C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, and N. D. Mermin, Phys.
Rev. Lett. 68, 557 (1992).
[12] C. H. Bennet and G. Brassard, Proceedings of the IEEE
Int. Conf. on Computers, Systems and Signal Processing,
Bangalore (1984).
[13] I. Csisza´r and J. Ko¨rner, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory IT-24,
339 (1978).
